

Additional materials: Maximizing the reliability of cross-national measures of presidential power

The studies included in the paper

1.) We identified the following 49 studies that operationalized a presidential power variable: Ishiyama 1995; Hellman 1996; Frye 1997; Ishiyama and Velten 1998; Escobar-Lemmon 2001; Frye 2002; Payne 2002; Roper 2002; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Nielson 2003; Pennings 2003; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004; Horowitz 2004; UNDP 2004; Clark and Wittrock 2005; UNDP 2005; Beliaev 2006; Bodenstein and Schneider 2006; Cheibub 2006; Stein et al 2006; Whitefield 2006; Pop-Eleches 2007; Tavits 2007a; Tavits 2007b; Armingeon and Careja 2008; Campos and Giovannoni 2008; Cheibub and Chernykh 2008; Hicken and Stoll 2008; Horowitz and Browne 2008; Kim and Bahry 2008; Negretto 2008; Tavits 2008b; Thyne and Moreno 2008; Vowles 2008; Cheibub and Chernykh 2009; Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009a; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009b; Tavits 2009; Alee and Peinhardt 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Doyle 2010; Kitschelt et al 2010; Scartascini et al 2010; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010; Wibbels and Roberts 2010; Crisp et al 2011; Doyle 2011; and Pereira et al 2011. Other studies included a discussion of presidential power, but failed to estimate its effect. See, for example, Protsyk 2005.

2.) We identified the following 19 studies that constructed a separate and original measure of presidential power: Clark and Wittrock 2005, 182; Doyle 2010, 318-319; Frye 2002, 90; Hellman 1996, 53; Hellman and Tucker 1995; Hicken and Stoll 2008, 1113; Johannsen 2002; McGregor 1994; Metcalf 2000, 669-670; Nijzink et al 2006, 322; Payne 2002, 197-198; Roper 2002, 257-258; Shugart 1996, 7; Shugart and Carey 1992, 155; Siaroff 2003; Spörer 2004, 164-165; Taghiyev 2006; and UNDP 2004, 92; UNDP 2005, Anexo, 76. Some of these measures are variations on an existing measure.

3.) We identified the following 16 studies that used one of the above measures, but that both/either reported scores for a different set of countries and/or

gave countries different scores from the original study: Cranenburgh 2008, 959; Cranenburgh 2009, 53; Elgie 2009, 253-254; Elgie 2011, 18-19; Elgie and Moestrup 2008, 252-253; Frye 1997, 547-548; Metcalf 2000, 674; Moestrup 2011a, 151-152; Moestrup 2011b, 253; Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto 2009, 264-267; Özsoy 2009, 96-98; Özsoy 2010, 146-147; Tavits 2009, 53; and Wu and Tsai 2011, 185. Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto 2009 and Tavits 2009 each provide two separate measures. When estimating the effect of presidential power, some writers failed to provide any information about how they constructed their measure of presidential power and failed to record the scores for individual countries. Other writers provided information about how they constructed their measure of presidential power, but failed to record the scores for individual countries either in the article or in replication material on their website. For some of these studies, it may be possible to try to reconstruct the scores for particular countries, but it would not possible to know whether the reconstructed scores matched those of the original author. Therefore, these studies are not included. In addition, this figure does not include studies where the scores of a separate study are merely duplicated and where, therefore, there are no original scores.

4.) We identified the following 5 measures of presidential power that provided scores for the behavioral power of presidents: Cranenburgh 2008; Costa Lobo and Amorim Neto 2009; Elgie 2011b; Siaroff 2003; Tavits 2008a.

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